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1 Introduction 
 
In today’s world, basically all devices are interconnected to each other via networks. 
There are multiple devices are in homes, offices, cars and production plants and they 
run various tasks to help with daily tasks. The number of connected devices is 
increasing all the time because manufactures present every day new internet 
connected devices for helping the users of these devices in their everyday life and 
creating new digital experiences. The existing and new Internet based devices are 
related to smart house appliances, smart cities, smart energy plants, automobiles, 
health care services, retail stores and transportation. Examples from those areas are 
home surveillance cameras and fridges, smart city applications for helping citizens to 
find a vacant parking slot and for health care sector’s personal trainer appliances.  
The key points with all those devices and appliances are that they are connected to 
the internet with the key purpose to improve the quality of life by offering digital 
experiences. Those devices produce different kind of information, raw data, and data 
and information are shared with other systems. The data which internet connected 
devices generate can be stored and then used for various purposes. For example, a 
fridge can tell the owner about the shortage of groceries which need to be ordered. 
One example could be from health care sector about the wearable sensor or monitor 
which tells the person’s state of health. That information is then shared via network 
with professionals in health care.  
There are plenty of different examples for different areas of life. One significant area 
using Internet connected devices is industrial production. The manufacturing 
business uses different kinds of sensors and monitoring tools for collecting important 
data from manufacturing machines and their conditions; based on that data the 
production is adjusted to be more effective. Also, one very important area is the 
collection of maintenance data from machines proactively; hence, maintenance 
breaks can be planned based on that data with shortest possible breaks. A very good 
live example about this appliance is “Train as Service” in the UK. The Azuma trains 
are manufactured by Hitachi and the idea is to collect sensor data from trains online 
and use that data as a base for maintenance and schedule the maintenance breaks 
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for individual trains based on that sensor data. (New Azuma trains arrive at UK port 
ahead of passenger services starting later this year 2018.) 
As can be seen, the world of connected devices is versatile covering basically all 
aspects of life. 
 
 
2 Defining the Internet of Things 
 
As described in the previous chapter, the aim of the internet connected devices is to 
help with everyday living. What are internet connected devices? There is a term to 
describe the internet connected devices; they are called Internet of Things devices, 
i.e. in short, IoT. 
 
2.1 General  
 
The term Internet of Things as a concept was mentioned first time in the 1990s. The 
current format of the expression was proposed by Kevin Asthon in 1999. (Ashton 
2009.) 
What is Internet of Things? How is the term defined? What does it mean? According 
the Gartner (N.d.), the industrial Internet consists of physical devices capable to 
monitor surroundings and transmit the monitored data to other devices and perform 
actions based on the monitored data intelligently. In short, it can be said that 
Internet of Things, IoT, relates to devices connected to each other via different 
communication methods and channels. Those devices are capable to transmit data 
and communicate with each other. The communication method and transmit paths 
can either be wireless or wired data paths, depending on the IoT device and its 
purpose. According to different research institutes such as Gartner (2017), there will 
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be up to 25 billion IoT devices by 2020. However, the figure can be much higher than 
estimated. 
The Internet of Things, IoT, is defined also by the Infrastructure of the International 
Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) in Global Standard Initiative (Internet of Things 
Global Standards Initiative N.d.).  The IoT is defined as global infrastructure for the 
information society for interconnecting physical and virtual assets, things, based on 
evolving interoperable communication channels and technologies. (ibid.). 
Lawrence Miller in “IoT Security for Dummies, INSIDE Secure Edition” (2016) defined 
the IoT as follows: IoT covers devices and objects connected over different 
communications protocols to each other. The devices can be computing devices, 
laptops or desktop computers or even tablets and smartphones. The communication 
paths in IoT are typically Bluetooth and Long Range Wide Area, Lora WAN, or mobile 
phone based wireless transmission paths like 3G and 4G type of transportation 
paths. Those transmission paths are typically defined as low power protocols, 
because typically IoT devices send a small amount of data with low transmit speed 
and in low range. In the future, IoT devices will can communicate with long range 
infrastructure with modern technologies such as 5th generation mobile networks, 
abbreviated as 5G. (IoT Innovation 2018; Tarkoma 2017.) 
 
2.2 Typical IoT devices nowadays 
 
IoT devices can be divided into consumer-based devices such as domestic appliances 
and home automations, and appliances for industrial use such as different kinds of 
sensors for measuring temperature, humidity and movement. Typical domestic 
appliances are e.g. surveillance cameras, network switches, routers and Network 
Attached Storages (NAS), fridges, smart televisions and cars. For home automation, 
i.e. smart homes, typical appliances are e.g. heating and ventilation systems, lighting 
control systems and different sensors for monitoring humidity and CO2 levels inside 
a house or buildings. (Internet of Things 2018.) 
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When talking about the industrial IoT, the term “Industry 4.0” needs to be 
mentioned. Industry 4.0 covers different kind of automation and manufacturing data 
exchange technologies. It has also been called “Smart Factory”. Smart factory covers 
cyber physical systems, the Internet of Things, cloud computing and cognitive 
learning. The term Industry 4.0 was first time mentioned in German government 
memo released 2013 (Moore 2018.) and the aim of that memo was to introduce 
high-tech strategy for fully almost computerised manufacturing industry without the 
human involvement. (Moore 2018.) In summary, Industry 4.0 means that factory 
machines and sensors communicate with each other with less or no human’s 
involvement. Therefore, automation with Industry 4.0 together with intellectual 
monitoring provides higher level automated production, which improves the quality 
of end-user products. Based on monitoring the results of the sensors, machines can 
adjust their run in a more efficient way. Normally, home computers and laptops or 
mobile phones do not count as IoT devices. (Moore 2018.) 
 
2.3 Future of IoT 
 
According to Gartner, (2017) there will be as many as 20 billion connected IoT 
devices in the year 2020. However, the fact is that the number of connected IoT 
devices in 2020 could be even higher because of inventions of new IoT appliances. 
Earlier, the growth trend has been as high as 31% from year to year. Currently in 
2017, the consumer segment presents 63% of the total number of IoT appliances. 
Also, the key factor will be on consumer side and low-cost devices playing a major 
part in the number of volumes. (ibid.) 
When talking about the future of the IoT, also market value plays a significant role. 
Even though consumers are purchasing bigger numbers of IoT appliances, the 
business side invests more in IoT devices. In 2017, 57% of spending on the IoT market 
came from business side. The growing trend comprises IoT services; still a small but 
rapidly growing sector. Figure 1 below shows the market values for IoT market from 
year 2016 up to 2020 as estimated. (ibid.) 
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Figure 1. IoT market value, 2016 – 2020 (Gartner 2017) 
 
 
3 Cyber Security 
 
The term “Cyber Security” needs to be defined first. The definition of this term is 
problematic, and the term can be written in several ways depending on speaker’s 
language. The word “cyber” itself is rather old, already seen in BBC’s fictional TV 
series Doctor Who when he battled against cyberman in 1966. (ENISA 2015, 10; 
Doctor Who N.d.) 
In 1985 writer William Gibson published his novel “Neuromancer” where he defines 
the term “cyberspace” as  
… a consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate 
operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts... 
A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer 
in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the non-
space of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding.  
(ENISA 2015, 10.) 
As can be seen, the definition of the term “cyber” as such is not relevant. The term 
cyber is nowadays also connected to different kinds of areas such as cyberpunk, 
which is a fiction type of novels; cybergoth is related to the music genre, 
cyberbullying, i.e. bullying others via internet or social media; and cybercrime which 
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is crimes made with help of computers. There are also other areas with which the 
term cyber can be connected, however, the focus of this thesis is on cyber security. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (N.d) defines cyber security in the following way: “The 
state of being protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic data, 
or the measures taken to achieve this.” In practice, the above sentence means that 
any unauthorized or criminal based misuse of electronic data or device is understood 
as cyber threat. Manipulating physical assets can also be measured as jeopardizing 
cyber security. However, the connection link between cyber security and information 
security is quite small because in many cases, the cyber security issues can be 
converted to information security issues and vice versa. Many public sources list 
these terms as synonyms. (ibid.) 
ENISA’s (2015, 10) for cyber security includes different domains which all together 
are measured as cyber security. The following figure (Figure 2) defines the 
connections between domains (ibid., 11): 
 
 
 
Figure 2. connections related to the cyber security 
 
 
The purpose of different domains is to protect corresponding areas. The following 
table defines different domains and their purpose in a more detailed way (ibid.). 
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Table 1. Domain definitions in cyber security 
Domain Definition 
Communications Security protection against threat which tries to influence 
technical infrastructure and manipulate 
characteristic values in such a way which is not 
intended by owner or designer 
Operations Security protecting against a threat which tries to 
manipulate processes or workflows into unwanted 
results 
Information Security protecting the data stored in cyber system against 
threat of theft, manipulation or deletion; in short 
InfoSec. 
Physical Security protecting the physical assets related to a cyber 
system; the assets could be servers, storages or 
network components. Also, protecting against 
unauthorized access is included in this domain. 
Military Security protecting against threats which are against 
physical assets; however, have a flavour of political, 
military or strategic aspect. 
 
 
As the figure and table above show, all those different security areas focus on their 
own speciality; however, they all are related to cyber security itself in the end. From 
that point of view, cyber security could also be understood as an umbrella term for 
different security domains. 
The definition in the following Figure 3 (ENISA 2015) shows the relationships 
between different components included in cyber security. The key point is to notice 
that cyber security is not only for technical protection of environment, but it includes 
key elements related to organizations, e.g. CIA and it also involves assets and 
possible threat sources. 
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Figure 3. Connections related to the cyber security 
 
 
One important definition related to cyber security is CIA. CIA stands for 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. With those terms it is defined that 
confidential material should be kept safe and one should be sure that it is not 
changed by an unauthorized counterpart. It should be available when needed for 
authorized users. CIA should be a key element on organizational level when defining 
information security and cyber security policies. 
There are few standards which define cyber security and its connections to 
information security. The ISO/IEC 27000 (2018) covers the information security which 
considers any assets related to cyber space under control. The ISO/IEC 27032 (2012), 
covers cyber security as its own subject; however, it intends to cover only assets 
connected to the internet. Other standardization organizations e.g. ITU-T, ETSI TC 
Cyber, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NATO Cooperative 
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and Committee on National Security Systems 
(NCSS) have defined the cyber security in their own documentations. The main 
principle in all these different organizations is the same; however, they have their 
own views of cyber security based on the intention of the organization. 
The main sources from standardizing in this master’s thesis are ISO/IEC 27000 and 
ISO/IEC 27032. 
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One basic term to be covered under this topic is Security Policy. In practice, it means 
securing the individual system, organization or other entity. The policy covers 
instruction and how to react in different types of security risks. One important term 
is also Cyber Security Policy, the aim of which is to provide instruction on how to 
protect public and private infrastructure against cyber threats and cyber-attacks. The 
Cyber Security policy can consist of controls against physical access to the hardware 
but also security controls for access via network, data or code injection. Like every 
other security policy, this also needs be agreed and defined by organization’s or 
company’s management together with security specialist. (Salonen 2017.) 
 
 
4 Research questions 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to research and study the cyber security level of IoT 
environment. The first part of thesis researches IoT environment from a theoretical 
perspective. The purpose is to gain a close understanding of the architectural 
concept and view of IoT environment. Also, the purpose is to understand what 
possible security methods protect the IoT environment. The second part of this 
thesis focuses on a case study environment which was built up to JYVSECTEC RGCE 
virtual environment. The environment consists of basic IoT elements such as 
temperature sensors and a cooling machine as well as data management 
applications. The following topics cover the test environment in a more detailed way. 
The purpose of this thesis is to find the answers to the following research questions: 
- What is the initial level of cyber security within the IoT environment? 
- What is the minimum acceptable level of cyber security in IoT 
environment? 
- What are the minimum implementations for improving the cyber security 
in the IoT environment? 
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Those questions together with thesis topic are purely out of the author’s own 
interest. 
 
5 The basic theory and key modules for the IoT 
 
 
5.1 Basic theory 
 
When discussing the Internet of Thing, IoT, devices or appliances, the commercial 
and industrial IoT appliances must be distinguished from each other. The commercial 
devices typically comprise smart house automation, surveillance cameras or sensors 
for providing more convenience for living. Nowadays, even automated vacuum 
cleaners and smart televisions can be counted as IoT devices. The number of IoT 
devices is increasing all the time as for smart homes, smart cities and the health care 
sector. (Miller 2016.) 
The industrially based IoT appliances, Industry 4.0, are typically sensors or similar 
devices generating measurable raw data from factory machines for providing 
information to be based on rational decision making. The purpose of the industrial 
IoT devices is to provide more information about an industrial process or a machine 
for guiding the production. The aim with the Industry 4.0 is to go towards smart 
factories even with less human involvement in production. (Moore 2018.) 
 
5.2 Key modules of the IoT 
 
The basic IoT devices or appliances typically consist of following parts from the 
architecture point of view: 
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1) sensor or any other smart object 
2) transport layer either aerial or wired 
3) switches or routers 
4) data collection server 
The basic modules in IoT environment are typically sensors for collecting measurable 
data, transport layer for delivering sensor data, computing devices and data analysis 
application and storage for storing the data. Figure 4 highlights the architecture point 
of view of the IoT environment. (Miller 2016, 6.) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. IoT system architecture and functional overview (Miller 2016, 6) 
 
 
As can be seen above, the key components are not just sensors or smart objects and 
servers for collecting data but the data path, the network, has a very important role 
in this architectural concept. The network together with the used protocol plays a 
significant role within IoT appliances. (Miller 2016, 32). The basic IoT architecture 
components are described more in depth in the following chapter. 
When considering the IoT device itself and excluding all external counterparts such 
as transmission paths, network components such as routers and data analysis 
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servers, the internal architecture of a simplified IoT device can be presented Figure 5. 
(Miller 2016, 7) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. IoT device architecture (Miller 2016, 11) 
 
 
There are similarities in IoT device architecture when it is compared to normal 
computers. As can be seen, the IoT device includes a host processor which is 
responsible for managing and controlling this device. The memory is used for storing 
data from sensors; however, also for storing application code for running purposes. 
The input/output devices such as keyboard and monitor are for user interfaces. The 
connectivity is implemented via network, wired or wireless. If the network is 
wireless, there are different methods to perform: WIFI Ethernet, Bluetooth or mobile 
connectivity via GSM 4G. The power source provides necessary power to the system. 
The sensors collect e.g. ambient temperature data from environment.  
These are the same modules and components as the main part of a normal 
computer’s architecture has. The difference between IoT devices and normal 
computers is sensors dedicated for collecting information from ambient 
environment. 
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Also, one key difference between IoT and normal computer is the size. Typically, IoT 
devices are much smaller and their power consumption is significantly lower than 
that of normal computers. IoT devices might be typically powered with small 
rechargeable or replaceable batteries. (Miller 2016, 32.) 
 
5.3 Sensors 
 
The purpose of sensors is to collect measurable data from a machine, device or 
ambient environment. The sensor is an electronic component which transforms 
temperature change, humidity or movement to electronic format and transmits the 
data to computer. Sensors are used widely in industry for measuring different 
parameters and in domestics IoT appliances. (Sensor 2012.) 
The sensors are used in everyday appliances for various purposes. For example, 
sensors are used in cars for measuring the gas exhaust level and based on that 
information, they adjust the settings of gasoline and oxygen of the car’s engine. One 
area for sensors are infrared sensors used for remote-control boxes for home 
entertainment, for motion detection and intrusion detectors. (Sensor 2012.) 
 
5.4 Network 
 
All devices need a network for transferring and receiving data for different purposes. 
When talking about IoT devices, there are basically two different options available, 
wired network with copper or fibre connections or wireless connections with 
different kinds of connections methods and protocols. The chosen transfer method 
always depends on what kind of IoT appliance it is, and what its purposes are. Also, 
the used protocol plays a significant role with IoT appliances. At this point, the power 
consumption should be mentioned because consumption differs between different 
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connections types. When counting all those different possibilities together, the 
transport layer with IoT devices is quite manifold. (Internet of Things 2018.) 
The wired network is usually produced with copper or fibre cables. Those methods 
support different kinds of connectors such as RJ45, which is widely used in 
computers for networking devices. If IoT devices are used with fibre connectivity, 
there are various connectivity types for networking. A typical connector type 
nowadays is SC snap-in connector. The benefit for using copper instead of fibre for 
connections is the cost. Copper cables are cheaper, and they resist more robust 
handling compared to fibre cables. The benefit with fibre cables is the transfer speed 
(copper 10G, fibre 100G) when compared to copper cables. (Guide to Fiber Optics & 
Premises Cabling. N.d.) 
For wireless connections, there are multiple choices available. The used transfer 
method should be selected based on the needed transfer distance because there are 
various categories for distance: short-range, medium-range and long-range wireless 
connections.  Examples for short-range are Bluetooth, Z-Wave and ZigBee transfer 
methods. The reason for using the short-range method is that these IoT devices are 
used as a personal area network (PAN) device, and they only need short-range low-
latency data transfer rate. The physical range is typically from few meters up to 100 
meters. The key point is also low power consumption. (Internet of Things 2018.) 
With medium-range wireless transfer methods, the low power consumption is also 
an important feature. The data rate might also be low; however, there might be a 
need for high-speed communication. Examples of these are HaLow, 802.11ah (IEEE 
801.11ah 2018) and LTE Advanced which is the enhanced version of Long Term 
Evolution, LTE (LTE Advanced). 
 Examples of long-range communication channels are Low-Power wide-area 
networking, LPWAN, very small aperture terminal VSAT and long-range WIFI 
connectivity methods. The important design factor also in this category is low data 
rate with reduced power consumption. Some examples of LPWAN are Lora WAN, 
SIGFOX and NB-IoT. (Internet of Things 2018.) 
A very common transport method today is to use 4G mobile network. It provides an 
effective method to transfer data with high speed, and the amount of data can also 
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be very high. In the future, the fifth generation of mobile network, 5G, will provide 
higher speed and high data range within a new frequency band to provide a more 
effective path for future IoT devices. (LTE Advanced 2018.) 
The used protocols with IoT devices are e.g. message Queuing Telemetry Transport, 
MQTT, which works on top of the TCP/IP protocol. The benefit with MQTT is that it is 
lightweight with small code footprint and therefore suitable for remote applications 
such as IoT appliances. (MQTT N.d.) 
One protocol to mention together with IoT appliances is Advanced Message Queuing 
Protocol, AMQP. It is based on open standard and its main purpose is to pass 
business messages between applications. (AMQP N.d.) 
 
5.5 Servers and storages 
 
From the architectural perspective, the servers in the IoT environment have multiple 
roles. The servers are needed from running application code to managing the 
necessary IoT applications. The IoT appliance may need various applications for 
running what it is intended to do. The application server could be either hardware 
based or a virtual installation on top of any hypervisor application. One key purpose 
with servers is to manage and handle raw sensor data. The term big data is often 
mentioned in this context. The big data applications and analysis are described 
shortly in the following chapter.  Managing the updates for various parts in IoT 
environment is also vital. The IoT environment consists of various hardware modules 
including their own firmware in each module. Those modules should be up-to-date 
during the lifecycle of the IoT appliance and therefore, the dedicated update server 
could be configured in the IoT environment. This same is relevant also for all 
software modules. 
The servers are needed for storing and managing the raw data generated by 
different kind of sensors. The amount of sensor data could be large; hence, storing 
the data only to server is not relevant and therefore, storing the data to separate 
disk storage makes sense. The storage system could be local disk storage based on 
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fibre channel connectivity, FC, or Network Attach Storage, NAS. One possibility is to 
use a cloud-based storage system from a well-known cloud vendor. 
One key role with server is the user authentication to ensure that only valid users 
have privilege to access IoT applications and managing the IoT data. There are 
several choices and best practices for managing user’s authentications. One 
possibility is to manage users and possible security keys locally in the IoT device itself 
or use a dedicated user management server or application for that purposes. The 
remote access possibilities and user authentications should also be handled within 
user management server and applications. 
 
5.6 Big data and analytics application 
 
One major part in IoT architecture is big data and analytics applications. There are 
currently various vendors that offer the applications for managing a large amount of 
data and manipulating the data in such a way that it is more human readable. The 
key point is also to understand whether the amount of data is growing all the time 
when more IoT appliances and devices are published for various purposes. (Hitachi 
Vantara Big Data Analytics 2017.) 
The amount of data generated by IoT devices is huge. It does not matter if the data is 
generated by a sensor or surveillance camera or any other IoT hardware device. The 
huge amount of data is basically useless until it has been analysed and adapted in 
such way that human can understand it. In the worst case, the generated sensor data 
is just a basic Ascii text without any formulations. Below, in Figure 6 there is an 
example of basic sensor data without any formulation: 
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Figure 6. Sensor data, temperature, air pressure and humidity 
 
 
The above data is generated with Sense Hat temperature and air pressure sensors 
running on top of Raspberry Pi 4 computer. As can be seen, the above numbers do 
not illustrate anything; they are just bunch of numbers. To visualize those numbers, 
the big data and analytics applications are needed.  
Today, the application market for big data and analytics tools is huge. Some of the 
applications only focus on one area such as big data or analytics; however, some 
vendors provide a complete application suite for covering all big data and analytics 
needs in one package. The following Figure 7 gives an idea of the availability of 
applications on the market. (Hitachi Vantara Big Data Analytics 2017). 
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Figure 7. Big data and analytics application in market 2017 
 
 
The purpose of a big data application is to help users to understand what is in the 
data, and more importantly, what is relevant in the data to meet the organization’s 
needs. It can be said that data without any analysis is almost useless. One key role 
with big data tools is also the ability to store the data and keep it in safe. (Hitachi 
Vantara Big Data Analytics 2017.) 
Figure 8 represents a solution for data flow from sensor side up to analytics 
application including the steps between (Hitachi Vantara Big Data Analytics 2017).  
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Figure 8. Data flow for sensor data, sample 
 
The example above shows typical data flow from sensors and the application 
modules needed for data analytics. The sensors and network modules are excluded 
from this example. 
This example is based on Hitachi Vantara’s 2017 solution for big data and analytics 
application suite. The data flow is from left to right. The raw sensor data or any 
unstructured or semi structured data is collected from various locations to one major 
location for storing purposes, in this case Hitachi Content Platform, HCP. After 
collection the data is modified in such a way that it is usable with Pentaho PDI tools. 
Pentaho PDI transmits the newly formulated data to Hadoop Cluster and for 
MongoDB database for storing purposes. Pentaho’s analytics tools fetch the data and 
modified and formulate it such a way that it is human readable like charts or graphs. 
(Hitachi Vantara Big Data Analytics 2017.) 
This thesis does not cover any big data and analytics applications. 
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6 Protecting the IoT environment 
 
6.1 General 
 
When thinking about the Internet of Things environment, the protection against 
external threats and vulnerabilities must be considered as important as in a normal 
ICT environment. The reason for that is the vast amount of IoT devices and 
environments which could be used for building up the bot networks or used for any 
other hostile activities. (Fruhlinger 2018.) 
There are many various public sources available which go through the possible 
scenarios related to various kinds of vulnerabilities and solutions for choosing the 
right protection mechanics for these various scenarios. The main sources in this 
chapter have been the following publications from public internet sources: 
1) IoT Security for Dummies by Lawrence Miller, 2016 
2) The 8 Biggest IoT Security Mistakes and How to Avoid Them, 2017 
3) Definition of Cybersecurity, Gaps and Overlaps in Standardisations V1.0, 2015 
4) Open Web Application Security Project, OWASP. 
Those various sources have different approaches for cyber security challenges. The 
first three concentrate mainly on protecting IoT environments from hardware 
perspective including the drivers and firmware levels as protections mechanics. 
OWAPS’s approach has a different angle compared to other publishers. Their focus is 
on protecting the IoT environment from a web application’s perspective. The other 
major difference with OWASP is that they do not recommend any commercial 
applications or services; their approach is to provide guidelines and a cheat sheet for 
building up a protected IoT environment. 
Gartner’s publications are one motivator for designing and building up secured IoT 
environments. According to Gartner (2017), the quantity of the connected ” things” 
will increase year by year by over 30 % and by 2020, the quantity of connected IoT 
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devices could be as high as 20.4 billion. The number of IoT devices by January 2017 
was 8,380,600 (Millions of units) (Gartner 2017). This means that the number of 
cyber-attacks will grow rapidly against the IoT environment because most of the 
environment are not protected well enough (Kennedy 2017). 
One aspect also related to the protection of the IoT environment against the cyber 
security threats is to think about an attacker’s motivation and reason for invasion. 
There are hackers invading systems because it is fun, and they are testing their own 
capabilities against different systems. One group of hackers try to cause harm as 
much as possible in diverse ways such as creating bot networks of the hacked 
environment and using them for their own purposes. One group of attackers try to 
gain economic benefit by stealing valuable information, personal or corporate 
secrets. Then one group to mention are hackers guided by governmental 
organizations with the purpose to influence other governments or focus on possible 
corporate espionage. (Solarwinds msp 2017.) 
The privacy and data security are the key questions today when considering the IoT 
devices on organizational level or in private use. The large-scale theft of information 
on personal identities or sensitive data from institution or organization is always a 
substantial risk in wrong hands. To ensure the appropriate level of protection for 
securing IoT ecosystems, the business organizations must perform a risk analysis. 
One part of performing a risk analysis is to implement appropriate safeguards. Also, 
the security management policy must be defined and implemented in internal 
processes. There is a risk that developers have not perceived the IoT environment as 
a target for invasions. That they might not consider the possible attack vectors during 
the development phase related to the environment. Therefore, the implementation 
of cyber security should be included in organizations procedures and processes to 
protect the organization’s intellectual property. (Salonen 2017; Solarwinds msp 
2017.) 
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6.2 Legislation, standards and guidelines 
 
The IoT as a technology and concept is quite new, and therefore the legislation and 
standardization are still under development phases. However, some standards 
already exist and therefore they can provide guidance for designing cyber secure IoT 
ecosystems. Good examples of current standards and guidelines are:  
1) Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE 2018), which describes possible 
weaknesses in IoT architecture and design 
2) Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (2018) is source of 
resource for identifying attack methods 
3) Computer Security Resource Center (2018) provides information about the 
United States Government computer security standard for accrediting 
cryptographic modules 
4) Common Criteria (N.d.) provides information for computer security 
certification development for the smart card industry based on ISO/IEC 15408 
International Standard. 
There is one very important set of standards related to information technology. 
ISO/IEC 27001 gives information related to Information Security Management 
System, ISMS, and the needed requirements. ISO/IEC27002 provides information for 
Code of practice for information security controls. ISO/IEC 27032 is a standard for 
“Guidelines for Cybersecurity” which defines common cyber security risks and 
different controls for the risks. Those standards are provided by International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO homepage.) The ISO/IEC27001 and 
ISO/IEC27001 standards include guidelines and requirements related to log 
management as well.  
Legislation and guidance always differ from country to country. For example, in 
Finland the Ministry of Defence has published Katakri (2015) document, which is 
national guidance for auditing cyber security criteria (Kansallinen 
turvallisuusauditointikriteeristö). One important guidance to mention is VAHTI (N.d.), 
published by the Ministry of Finance. The purpose of this document is to improve 
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cyber security awareness in government organizations. An important national 
organization to mention in this section is Viestintävirasto Kyberturvallisuuskeskus, 
which is responsible for publishing cyber security threats and providing guidance. 
This organization provides service for Finnish public consumers; however, some of 
their services are only available for state of administration and security-critical 
organizations. 
The legislation related to the intelligence legislation is currently under adoption in 
Finland. The purpose is to give mandate for authorizations to improve Finnish 
protection capabilities against serious threats against national security. This new law 
would improve Finnish Security Intelligent Service’s capability to investigate and 
inquire network traffic in case of serious threats if it is allowed by court. (Ministry of 
the Interior 2018.) 
 
6.3 Attack vector 
 
The key term related to cyber security and attack is the attack vector. What is attack 
vector? Attack vector is a method and technique used by an external or internal 
counterpart with the purpose to assault or exploit the environment, network, 
compute or another device. Often the purpose is also to gain access to an 
environment to deliver a payload or malicious outcome. Usually the purposes for 
those actions are hostile and aim at collecting sensitive information, pecuniary 
benefit or carry out other harmful activities against the organization. It can be said 
that attack vector is the path or route to carry out hostile activities against the 
environment. The vulnerabilities are in key role in attack vectors because these 
weaknesses are exposed to the risks from the environment. There are plenty of 
public web sites on the internet which define the attack vectors. Figure 9 below 
explains the path from threat agent up to business impact very clearly: 
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Figure 9. Threat agent (OWASP 2017) 
 
 
This figure is taken from the web pages of Open Web Application Security, OWASP 
(2017). It shows clearly the relationship of attack vectors, security weaknesses, 
security controls, technical impacts and their influence on business. Typical attack 
vectors could include viruses, email attachment, web pages and pop-up windows; 
however, the actual list is much longer. Very common malicious payloads are viruses, 
Trojan horses, worms and different kind of spywares. The common factors with 
those malicious payloads are that programming skills and knowledge of different 
applications and operating systems are needed. (Salonen 2017.) 
When considering the attack vectors against the environment, one major element 
related to security is the risk rating methodology related to different attacks and 
their severity. The following Figure 10 shows one version of risks related to 
exploitability, weakness prevalence, weakness detectability, technical impact and 
finally business impact. By using that table, the calculation of risk factors is easier and 
more illustrative. (OWASP 2017.) 
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Figure 10. OWASP Risk Rating Methodology (2017) 
 
 
When considering the attack vectors, it is important to keep in mind that attacks do 
not only come from the network via email and web application but also the physical 
attack vectors must be considered as important as attacks via network. (Salonen 
2017.) 
The following chapters will cover more in depth the key areas related to the 
vulnerabilities and cyber security recommendations for securing the IoT 
environment. 
 
 
6.4 Protection of IoT 
 
The basic question is why the intellectual data generated by IoT devices or IoT assets 
needs to be protected. One reason is to protect one’s own intellectual property 
against other competitors. Also, the own data and environment need to be protected 
because that is a way of preventing others to compromise one’s own environment 
and use it for malicious purposes. One important reason for security is the overall 
security, i.e. the internet comprises interconnected systems and any of its vulnerable 
parts may be used to harm the other parts of the internet. Therefore, it is extremely 
important to protect one’s own intellectual properties. (Sagedhi 2017.) 
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One aspect to see how the cyber security is related to an IoT device can presented 
with the following triangle. The purpose of the triangle is to visualize the necessary 
steps needed to acquire a higher level of security awareness with IoT devices. (ibid.) 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Cyber security awareness triangle (Sagedhi 2017) 
 
 
The triangle should be observed from the bottom level it and one should go further 
up step by step with the top green level as target. (ibid.). 
The first two grey steps are the starting point on the path to a higher security level. 
These two levels mean basically a normal internet without any security features and 
for example, there could duplicate MACs or IP addresses causing security issues. 
(ibid.) 
The next three levels, basic security, standard practice security and sophisticated 
security are a higher level of security awareness. The protection methods 
implemented within these three steps are like unique passwords; the latest software 
and firmware versions, secured communication protocol such as HTTPS securing web 
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frontends and security architecture. These steps are the first implemented security 
procedures and therefore they enhance situation awareness. (ibid.) 
The next three levels with yellow present a higher level of security implementation in 
an IoT environment. The overall security awareness is on a new level. The practical 
implementations with these levels are like swarm attestation, IoT sentinel and the 
implementation of automatic vulnerability and attack detection. One key element is 
a log management system, which enhances the knowledge of system usage by 
collecting and analysing data in the maintenance log, usage log and access log.  
The top green triangle is the level where one should strive to whenever it is possible 
and reasonable as well as economically wise. (ibid.) 
When considering the top green triangle, the cost level to achieve that security 
target should be defined by the organizations, and it should correlate with the value 
of the intellectual property. If the value of the IoT appliance and generated data is 
low and the benefit for organization is minor, it is not worth investing a great deal of 
resources in protection that appliance and data. 
 
6.5 Points of vulnerabilities 
 
When considering the basic IoT environment, Figure 12 below shows pre-digested 
schematics of possible vulnerable components. The IoT environment consists of 
many components and layers which possible are targets for attackers. (Miller 2016, 
6). 
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Figure 12. IoT points of vulnerabilities (Miller 2016, 6) 
 
 
The key point in Figure 12 above is to notify that possible vulnerable points are not 
only hardware related but also software and application related attack targets. By 
analysing the IoT environment such as the one above, there is a possibility to define 
possible attack vectors used by attackers. The following chapter contains more 
information about the vulnerable points and how to protect against possible external 
threats.  
 
6.5.1 Universal problems 
 
The environment consists of a basic sensor which collects measurable data. The 
sensor’s data is transmitted to IoT server via physical transmission path either in 
wireless or wired network. There are also other physical counterparts involved in the 
transmission path from sensor to server, such as gateways and public internet 
connections. The software part of IoT environment consists of e.g. user accounts 
with credentials, applications and operating systems. Finally, the sensor data is 
stored to mass storages devices. 
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According to Praetorian (2017), transport layer weaknesses, vulnerability to account 
compromise and shared default secrets count as universal problems.  
Based on their assessment, the problems in transport layer weaknesses were caused 
by traffic with no encryption enabled for sensitive data, older protocols used and 
problems with certification and weak ciphers. Those altogether caused plenty of 
vulnerability risks in IoT environments. (Praetorian 2017.) 
The compromise in the account was caused by weak password policy and lack of 
lockout feature of used accounts. Also, a major part was of security risks was caused 
by a possibility to enumerate active user accounts. (ibid.) 
The last in universal problem by Praetorian (2017) is the shared default secret. That 
one is very critical in case of a cloud based IoT environment. In practice, it means 
that any new user might share the same user password and encryption key, which 
allows possible attackers to cause vulnerability to the complete IoT ecosystem by 
recovering the secret key from a single device. (Praetorian 2017.) 
 
6.5.2 Device specific concerns 
 
According to Praetorian (2017), the device-specific security concerns are like debug 
services enabled, missing patches and insecure updates. These items are defined 
based on assessments.  
Debug service enabled means in practice that IoT hardware device has in system 
board the JTAG debug connector, serial connectors or USB ports enabled and 
available, where attackers can connect their own device to compromise the 
hardware. The purposes of those connectors are to provide more debug information 
for developers in the development phase and in many cases, those connectors and 
ports are left in ready-made devices. (Praetorian 2017.) 
 
Missing patches are caused by cases where the IoT appliances are built up with 
certain levels of operating systems and patches, and by the time of production the 
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working combination is not updated anymore because of a risk to break something. 
Those patch versions might be months or even years old versions. (ibid.) 
 
The insecure updates present a case where the update process and functionality are 
compromised. In such a situation where the compromise has occurred once or all 
following circumstances are true: the device has failed to be identified to update 
server, the connections are not secured, or signature verification is failed before 
update. (ibid.) 
 
6.5.3 Warning narratives 
 
Praetorian (2017), defines the warning narrative as follows: inheriting vendor’s 
security and balancing security with user experience.  
The typical example of inherited vendor’s security is such where the client uses 
outsourced chip from a third-party vendor, and that chip is not secure enough to 
store or handle sensitive data. The data can be accessed from chip directly by reading 
the memory contents address by address. (Praetorian 2017.) 
The user experience is also important. The usability of a device should be easy 
enough that it is meaningful to use. However, on the other side, the security should 
be at a certain level for the device to be safe enough to use. It is very common that 
usability goes over security as a result of unsecure devices and appliances. (ibid.) 
 
6.5.4 Cyber security recommendations 
 
When considering the securing recommendations for IoT environment, there are 
various sources with predefined recommendations and actions for protecting against 
possible external threat actors. 
Based on Praetorian (2017), there are different protecting methods depending on 
the threats. For protecting and securing the transport layer vulnerabilities, the best 
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way to protect is to use secured communication protocols such as TLS or SSH. 
Additionally, using strong ciphers and trusted services secures the transport path 
between devices. Using ready-made test tools for verification of a secured transport 
layer is also recommended. One example is a tool made by OWASP, Transport Layer 
Protection Cheat Sheet (2017). 
Protecting against the account compromising there are several steps to perform. 
First, the password policy should be defined in such a way that password length is set 
to minimum, complexity is required, and password aging is defined. Additionally, 
defining user lock out timer in case of failed login attempts is good practice. Good 
practice is also to prevent the account enumeration for external responses. OWASP 
also provides cheat sheet instructions for protecting user authentication. (OWASP 
2017; Praetorian 2017.) 
Protection against shared default secrets is made at the beginning of the deployment 
process of new installations. The method is to force a user to change and set their 
own passwords during the login process. One possibility to protection is to allow user 
or application to generate their own secret key at the beginning. (Praetorian 2017.) 
Debugging services are needed for troubleshooting purposes; in particular at the 
development phase of the IoT appliance. The protection against misuse of those 
services is quite straightforward; all unnecessary services and ports must be disabled 
to prevent misuse. The hardware related ports are like JTAG, USB, serial connection 
and SD card reader, and processes are such as Telnet and SSH. (ibid.) 
It is very common that readymade appliances are running with old, outdated levels 
of patches. That was also noted as one major possible vulnerability by Praetorian. 
The recommended protection method is to implement an automated updating 
process. One possible protection method is to build up custom made versions with 
the required functionality. That will also help with defining the required patch 
process in products. An important part is also to follow newly published 
vulnerabilities and then implement the necessary patches to protect the 
environment. Related to this, it is important to have an up-to-date product inventory 
which tells the different versions published earlier. (ibid.) 
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Related to the patch levels and update policies, the insecure updates have been 
defined as one possible vulnerability. The recommended method is to protect by 
using certificates to ensure secure connections. Also, the use of TSL ensures that 
connections between client and server are secured and there is no risk that intruders 
can hijack a connection such as in the man-in-the-middle attack. The downloadable 
package should be hashed and signed for protection purposes. It will ensure the 
integrity of the downloadable package. OWASP provides a cheat sheet to help to 
ensure the protected method for securing updates. (Praetorian 2017; OWASP 2017.) 
The protection for the above cyber security risks is easily accomplished with few 
common best practices, e.g. regular updates for all software modules related to the 
IoT appliance, securing the transfer method by using encrypted and secure data 
path, and ensuring the integrity of downloadable software packages. One important 
best practice to mention is user management together with password policy. Most of 
the potential vulnerabilities could be avoided with those listed best practices. 
(Praetorian 2017.) 
 
 
7 Case study, cyber security in cloud based IoT environment 
 
7.1 Introduction of the case study 
 
The case study focuses on the cyber security view of cloud-based Internet of Things 
environment with two sensors and one cooler unit. The environment is built up to 
JYVSECTEC’s Cyber Range, RGCE, a cloud provider value chain case study. The 
configuration is described in the following chapter, Configuration architecture. This 
case study focused mainly on cyber security elements and how to make the system 
more secure. The basic IoT functionality, configuration and relationships of different 
modules were out of the scope of this case study. 
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The cyber security level after installation with default settings is not typical enough 
to give a decent level of security. Normally, all user credentials, e.g. user ids and 
passwords are default ones which are typically very well-known and searchable from 
the internet. Quite often the installed software modules are behind the latest patch 
and secure levels. Also, the used operating systems in IoT environment might be out-
of-date what comes to the OS versions. 
This part of the master’s thesis focuses on a case study of Internet of Things 
environment, which is produced by RGCE cloud environment. The following chapter 
consists of the configuration overview of the used environment from hardware and 
software perspective. 
When considering the IoT environment from cyber security point of view, the 
following key questions are the ones which this master’s thesis answers based on the 
case study: 
 
1) What is the initial level of cyber security within the IoT environment? 
2) What is the minimum acceptable level of cyber security in the IoT 
environment? 
3) What is the minimum implementation for improving the cyber security in the 
IoT environment? 
 
7.2 Scope of the case study 
 
This case study focuses only on cyber security view in JYVSECTEC’s Internet of Things 
environment. The study does not focus on the installation and configuration of the 
IoT environment. Also, the functionality of the virtual environment, RGCE, is out of 
the scope of this study. This master’s thesis does not cover installation steps and 
configuration details to build up an IoT environment for customer ready usage. More 
detailed description about the JYVSECTEC’s cyber range environment is found in the 
online document provided by JYVSECTEC.  
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This case study also excludes commercial smart home IoT appliances such as 
surveillance cameras, network devices and smart televisions. Also, the hardening of 
the operating system in various modules in this environment is out of the scope. 
However, normal procedures for upgrading patches to operating systems is a part of 
this thesis. 
 
7.3 Configuration architecture 
 
The environment is built up with cloud based IoT implementation provided by the 
virtual machines of RGCE. The used IP address allocations are not based on the real 
public internet IP address space; the used IP addresses are virtual and without real 
connections to the public internet. 
The purpose of the environment is to provide sensor data from two temperature 
sensors and based on that data, control and adjust one cooler unit. 
The high-level overview of the environment from the perspective of software 
modules is following. 
The IoT environment is built over ThingsBoard, which is an open-source IoT platform. 
The ThingsBoard needs two different basic service modules to handle the IoT 
environment: Apache Zookeeper, cluster orchestration software module and service 
coordination; and Apache Cassandra, a database for storing the IoT configuration and 
application data.  
Figure 13 below gives the view of the connected modules and their relations to each 
other. 
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Figure 13. High level architecture view of environment 
 
Figure 14 shows the overview of the ThingsBoard’s dashboard view for sensor 
temperature data. 
 
Figure 14. Dashboard view for sensor data by ThingsBoard 
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7.4 Defining security implementation 
 
When considering the cyber security for the IoT environment, it is necessary to think 
what possible attack vectors there might be against the environment. Therefore, 
security administrator and system administrator need to think what the possible 
vulnerability of the environment could be. The methods for analysing the 
environment could be similar to the zero-day vulnerabilities analysis (Salonen 2017; 
Palmers 2013): 
1) analyse environment 
2) test environment 
3) report/document findings  
4) design mitigations activities. 
The zero-day attack is an attack, that exploits computer appliances before the 
vulnerability is known or patched against the vulnerable. The quality assurance 
process like Unknown Vulnerability Management Process is to aid the administrator 
to identify possible weakness in system before appliance is released to market. The 
main reason is to identify possible critical points from the vulnerability view and 
design potential mitigation solution against them. (Salonen 2017; Palmers 2013.) 
 
7.4.1 Attack vectors in case study environment 
 
After considering the attack vectors against the environment, good knowledge of the 
architecture and data flow is an essential part of design. It should also be kept in 
mind that physical security is also generally very important part of security. 
Typically, the IoT environment consists of physical devices such as sensors, servers 
and network data paths. If the physical immunity is compromised, there is a 
considerable risk that the complete IoT appliance is exploited by attackers and, in the 
worst case, it is used as part of botnet which will affect other appliances and 
counterparts. 
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When considering the attack vectors, a very important part are system level attack 
methods exploiting the flaws in the security design or general implementation. 
The following two chapters describe possible attack vectors against this IoT 
environment; however, this is not a complete outcome of all possible attack 
scenarios. 
 
7.4.2 Physical based attack vector  
 
Quite often the hardware-based protection against offensives is not considered a 
substantial risk. The attackers can gain physical access to an IoT device, tamper the 
configuration information related to the device, reconfigure the device to send 
malicious data or attach a part of it to the botnet. The risk that attackers break down 
to the IoT device is also high. Table 2 describes the key elements for a physical attack 
vector and the table is built up collecting elements from OWASP’s and MITRE’s web 
pages.  
 
 
Table 2. physical attack vector 
Attack vector 
Unauthorized physical access to environment 
 Security weakness Physical security of the environment components 
 Mitigation Physical installation of environment to separate data 
center with authorized access only. Place critical 
components to lockable racks or cabinets and design 
user access management procedure to access keys. 
 Technical impact Feed incorrect measurement data to system, physical 
damages, uncontrolled change of configuration. 
Perform malicious firmware or microcode upgrade to 
IoT device itself. 
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 Business impact Feed incorrect measurement data to system, physical 
damages, uncontrolled change of configuration. 
Monetary loss, reputation loss. 
 
 
When considering possible physical attack vectors against the case study 
environment, the probability of risk for a physical attack is rather low; however, it 
should be kept in mind as a potential risk of attack method. 
 
7.4.3 Application based attack vectors 
 
When considering the possible attack vector against the applications, servers and 
network, there are not only few attacks vectors against the environment but a 
considerable number of attack vectors. The security and system administrator should 
consider all those areas separately and if possible, use readymade cheat sheets to 
help to protect environment against vulnerabilities.  
In this case study, the application-based attack vectors are based on Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP 2017). The reason for using OWASP as a source 
was because they have covered the most typical attack vectors against web 
applications. Also, those attack vectors could be relevant when considering possible 
threats against the IoT environment as such. Therefore, many of those risks are 
applicable to this case study. There are also two attack vectors not included in 
OWASP which could be possible attack vectors against this IoT environment. The 
following attack vectors presented in Table 3 have been considered to be possible 
threats against this IoT configuration: 
 
Table 3. List of possible attack vectors (OWASP 2017; a part by the author) 
Attack vectors 
Broken Authentication, OWASP ref A2: 2017 
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Sensitive data exposure, OWASP ref A3: 2017 
Security misconfiguration, OWASP ref A6: 2017 
Cross-Site Scripting, OWASP ref A7: 2017 
Using component with known vulnerabilities, OWASP ref A9: 2017 
Insufficient logging & monitoring, OWASP ref A10: 2017 
Manipulating user data in different tenant inside IoT framework 
Denial of Service attack against IoT environment 
Man-In-the-Middle attack against IoT environment 
 
 
The following tables describe (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12) the key elements for the 
possible attack vectors. Note that the tables below do not present a complete set of 
all attack combinations against this environment. The tables are built up by collecting 
the key elements from OWASP’s and MITRE’s web pages. (OWASP 2017; Mitre 2018). 
 
 
Table 4. Broken authentication, (OWASP 2017; Mitre 2018) 
Broken authentication, OWASP ref A2: 2017 
 Attack vector Attackers have access to hundreds of millions of valid 
username and password combinations for credential 
stuffing, default administrative account lists, automated 
brute force, and dictionary attack tools. Session 
management attacks are well understood, particularly in 
relation to unexpired session tokens. 
 Security weakness The prevalence of broken authentication is widespread due 
to the design and implementation of most identity and 
access controls. Session management is the bedrock of 
authentication and access controls and is present in all 
stateful applications. 
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Attackers can detect broken authentication using manual 
means and exploit them using automated tools with 
password lists and dictionary attacks. 
 Prevention, and 
mitigation measures 
1) When possible implement multifactor 
authentication to prevent automated, credential 
stuffing, brute force and stolen credential re-use 
attacks.  
2) Do not ship or deploy with any default credentials 
particularly for admin users.  
3) Implement weak-password checks 
4) Align password length, complexity and rotation 
policies with modern, evidence based password 
policies. 
5) Ensure registration, credential recovery, and API 
pathways are hardened against account 
enumeration attacks by using the same messages 
for all outcomes. 
6) Limit or increasingly delay failed login attempts. 
Log all failures and alert administrators when 
credential stuffing, brute force, or other attacks are 
detected. 
7) Use a server-side, secure, built-in session manager 
that generates a new random session ID with high 
entropy after login. Session IDs should not be in the 
URL, be securely stored and invalidated after 
logout, idle, and absolute timeouts. 
 Technical impact Attackers have to gain access to only a few accounts, or just 
one admin account to compromise the system.  
 Business impact Depending on the domain of the application, this may allow 
money laundering, social security fraud, and identity theft, 
or disclose legally protected highly sensitive information. 
 
 
The above scenario is possible threat because the used applications are build up the 
cloud based IoT environment. Quite often vendors for such applications have listed 
their default user ids and passwords in their product web pages. Therefore, this kind 
of attack vector is relevant in any environment using commonly available 
applications. 
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Table 5. Sensitive data exposure, (OWASP 2017; Mitre 2018) 
Sensitive data exposure, OWASP ref A3: 2017 
 Attack vector Rather than directly attacking crypto, attackers steal keys, 
execute man-in-the-middle attacks, or steal clear text data 
off the server, while in transit, or from the user’s client, e.g. 
browser. A manual attack is generally required. Previously 
retrieved password databases could be brute forced by 
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). 
 Security weakness Over the last few years, this has been the most common 
impactful attack. The most common flaw is simply not 
encrypting sensitive data. When crypto is employed, weak 
key generation and management, and weak algorithm, 
protocol and cipher usage is common, particularly for weak 
password hashing storage techniques. For data in transit, 
server-side weaknesses are mainly easy to detect, but hard 
for data at rest. 
 Prevention, and 
mitigation measures 
1) Classify data processed, stored or transmitted by 
an application. Identify which data is sensitive 
according to privacy laws, regulatory requirements, 
or business needs.  
2) Apply controls as per the classification. 
3) Don't store sensitive data unnecessarily. Discard it 
as soon as possible or use PCI DSS compliant 
tokenization or even truncation. Data that is not 
retained cannot be stolen. 
4) Make sure to encrypt all sensitive data at rest. 
5) Ensure up-to-date and strong standard algorithms, 
protocols, and keys are in place; use proper key 
management. 
6) Encrypt all data in transit with secure protocols 
such as TLS with perfect forward secrecy (PFS) 
ciphers, cipher prioritization by the server, and 
secure parameters. Enforce encryption using 
directives like HTTP Strict Transport Security 
(HSTS). 
7) Disable caching for response that contain sensitive 
data. 
8) Store passwords using strong adaptive and salted 
hashing functions with a work factor (delay factor), 
such as Argon2, scrypt, bcrypt or PBKDF2. 
9) Verify independently the effectiveness of 
configuration and settings. 
 Technical impact Failure frequently compromises all data that should have 
been protected. 
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 Business impact Typically, this information includes sensitive personal 
information (PII) data such as health records, credentials, 
personal data, and credit cards, which often require 
protection as defined by laws or regulations such as the EU 
GDPR or local privacy laws. 
 
 
This attack vector is related to broken authentication, because both are related to 
weak password management. Therefore, the delivery method of sensitive data like a 
password or business secrets must be protected in proper way using SSL or TSL 
protocols. Also, valuable information should be encrypted with salted hashing 
functions. 
 
 
Table 6. Security misconfiguration, (OWASP 2017; Mitre 2018) 
Security misconfiguration, OWASP ref A6: 2017 
 Attack vector Attackers will often attempt to exploit unpatched flaws or 
access default accounts, unused pages, unprotected files 
and directories, etc to gain unauthorized access or 
knowledge of the system. 
 Security weakness Security misconfiguration can happen at any level of an 
application stack, including the network services, platform, 
web server, application server, database, frameworks, 
custom code, and pre-installed virtual machines, 
containers, or storage. Automated scanners are useful for 
detecting misconfigurations, use of default accounts or 
configurations, unnecessary services, legacy options, etc. 
 Prevention, and 
mitigation measures 
Secure installation processes should be implemented, 
including: 
1) A repeatable hardening process that makes it fast 
and easy to deploy another environment that is 
properly locked down. Development, QA, and 
production environments should all be configured 
identically, with different credentials used in each 
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environment. This process should be automated to 
minimize the effort required to setup a new secure 
environment.  
2) A minimal platform without any unnecessary 
features, components, documentation, and 
samples. Remove or do not install unused features 
and frameworks. 
3) A task to review and update the configurations 
appropriate to all security notes, updates and 
patches as part of the patch management process 
(see A9:2017-Using Components with Known 
Vulnerabilities). In particular, review cloud storage 
permissions (e.g. S3 bucket permissions). 
4) A segmented application architecture that provides 
effective, secure separation between components 
or tenants, with segmentation, containerization, or 
cloud security groups (ACLs). 
5) Sending security directives to clients, e.g. Security 
Headers. 
6) An automated process to verify the effectiveness of 
the configurations and settings in all environments. 
 Technical impact Such flaws frequently give attackers unauthorized access to 
some system data or functionality. Occasionally, such flaws 
result in a complete system compromise. 
 Business impact The business impact depends on the protection needs of 
the application and data. 
 
 
This attack vector is also relevant for the case study environment. The fact is that 
there could be an error in the configuration of software modules or transport 
protocols, which will leave the security weakness in the environment available for 
security flaws. 
 
 
Table 7. Cross-site Scripting, (OWASP 2017; Mitre 2018) 
Cross-Site Scripting, OWASP ref A7: 2017 
 Attack vector Automated tools can detect and exploit all three forms of 
XSS, and there are freely available exploitation frameworks. 
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 Security weakness XSS is the second most prevalent issue in the OWASP Top 
10 and is found in around two thirds of all applications. 
Automated tools can find some XSS problems 
automatically, particularly in mature technologies such as 
PHP, J2EE / JSP, and ASP.NET. 
 Prevention, and 
mitigation measures 
Preventing XSS requires separation of untrusted data from 
active browser content. This can be achieved by: 
1) Using frameworks that automatically escape XSS by 
design, such as the latest Ruby on Rails, React JS. 
Learn the limitations of each framework's XSS 
protection and appropriately handle the use cases 
which are not covered.  
2) Escaping untrusted HTTP request data based on the 
context in the HTML output (body, attribute, 
JavaScript, CSS, or URL) will resolve Reflected and 
Stored XSS vulnerabilities. The OWASP Cheat Sheet 
'XSS Prevention' has details on the required data 
escaping techniques. 
3) Applying context-sensitive encoding when 
modifying the browser document on the client-side 
acts against DOM XSS. When this cannot be 
avoided, similar context sensitive escaping 
techniques can be applied to browser APIs as 
described in the OWASP Cheat Sheet 'DOM based 
XSS Prevention'. 
4) Enabling a <u>Content Security Policy (CSP) as a 
defense-in-depth mitigating control against XSS. It 
is effective if no other vulnerabilities exist that 
would allow placing malicious code via local file 
includes (e.g. path traversal overwrites or 
vulnerable libraries from permitted content 
delivery networks). 
 Technical impact The impact of XSS is moderate for reflected and DOM XSS, 
and severe for stored XSS, with remote code execution on 
the victim's browser, such as stealing credentials, sessions, 
or delivering malware to the victim. 
 Business impact Stealing user credentials, sessions or delivering malware to 
the victim. 
 
The management software modules in the case study environment run on top of 
web browsers. There is a risk that using an unsecure HTTP protocol enables this 
possible vulnerability. 
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Table 8. Using component with known vulnerabilities, (OWASP 2017; Mitre 2018) 
Using component with known vulnerabilities, OWASP ref A9: 2017 
 Attack vector While it is easy to find already-written exploits for many 
known vulnerabilities, other vulnerabilities require 
concentrated effort to develop a custom exploit. 
 Security weakness Prevalence of this issue is very widespread. Component-
heavy development patterns can lead to development 
teams not even understanding which components they use 
in their application or API, much less keeping them up to 
date. 
Some scanners such as retire.js help in detection, but 
determining exploitability requires additional effort. 
 Prevention, and 
mitigation measures 
There should be a patch management process in place to: 
1) Remove unused dependencies, unnecessary 
features, components, files, and documentation.  
2) Continuously inventory the versions of both client-
side and server-side components (e.g. frameworks, 
libraries) and their dependencies using tools like 
versions, DependencyCheck, retire.js, etc. 
Continuously monitor sources like CVE and NVD for 
vulnerabilities in the components. Use software 
composition analysis tools to automate the 
process. Subscribe to email alerts for security 
vulnerabilities related to components you use. 
3) Only obtain components from official sources over 
secure links. Prefer signed packages to reduce the 
chance of including a modified, malicious 
component. 
4) Monitor for libraries and components that are 
unmaintained or do not create security patches for 
older versions. If patching is not possible, consider 
deploying a virtual patch to monitor, detect, or 
protect against the discovered issue. 
 
Every organization must ensure that there is an ongoing 
plan for monitoring, triaging, and applying updates or 
configuration changes for the lifetime of the application or 
portfolio. 
 Technical impact While some known vulnerabilities lead to only minor 
impacts, some of the largest breaches to date have relied 
on exploiting known vulnerabilities in components. 
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 Business impact Depending on the assets you are protecting, perhaps this 
risk should be at the top of the list. 
 
 
The above attack vector A9 is one of the most critical attack vector to protect 
against. If the administrator does not know the used versions of the components, it 
generates considerable risk for application vulnerabilities. This includes all 
components such as operating system, web applications, database application, 
application programming interfaces (API) and possible libraries related to appliance. 
Typically, any out-of-date component generates a possible attack path for intruders. 
This is a potential risk in the case study environment. 
 
 
Table 9. Insufficient logging & monitoring, (OWASP 2017; Mitre 2018) 
Insufficient logging & monitoring, OWASP ref A10: 2017 
 Attack vector Exploitation of insufficient logging and monitoring is the 
bedrock of nearly every major incident. 
Attackers rely on the lack of monitoring and timely 
response to achieve their goals without being detected. 
 Security weakness This issue is included in the Top 10 based on an industry 
survey. 
One strategy for determining if you have sufficient 
monitoring is to examine the logs following penetration 
testing. The testers' actions should be recorded sufficiently 
to understand what damages they may have inflicted. 
 Prevention, and 
mitigation measures 
As per the risk of the data stored or processed by the 
application: 
1) Ensure all login, access control failures, and server-
side input validation failures can be logged with 
sufficient user context to identify suspicious or 
malicious accounts, and held for sufficient time to 
allow delayed forensic analysis.  
2) Ensure that logs are generated in a format that can 
be easily consumed by a centralized log 
management solutions. 
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3) Ensure high-value transactions have an audit trail 
with integrity controls to prevent tampering or 
deletion, such as append-only database tables or 
similar. 
4) Establish effective monitoring and alerting such 
that suspicious activities are detected and 
responded to in a timely fashion. 
5) Establish or adopt an incident response and 
recovery plan, such as NIST 800-61 rev 2 or later. 
There are commercial and open source application 
protection frameworks such as OWASP AppSensor, web 
application firewalls such as ModSecurity with the OWASP 
ModSecurity Core Rule Set, and log correlation software 
with custom dashboards and alerting. 
 Technical impact Most successful attacks start with vulnerability probing. 
Allowing such probes to continue can raise the likelihood of 
successful exploit to nearly 100%. 
 Business impact In 2016, identifying a breach took an average of 191 days – 
plenty of time for damage to be inflicted. 
 
 
To protect against the above attack vector A10, the solution is to log and monitor the 
environment. The good practice of logging and monitoring environment does not 
protect against hostile offensives; however, it will give to the administrators’ 
sufficient time frame to react to a possible attack and start necessary defence 
measurements. Also, predefined alerting threshold values, e.g. network traffic, give 
time to response in timely manner. 
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Table 10. Manipulating user data in different tenant 
Manipulating user data in different tenant inside IoT framework 
 Attack vector Customer can manipulate sensitive information in different 
tenant inside the IoT framework. 
 Security weakness This could be similar assumption like OWASP ref A2:2017 
were the user credentials are compromised. Therefore, 
customer might be able to see confidential data from guest 
tenant.  
 Prevention, and 
mitigation measures 
Protection would be to change default password’s right 
after the system is configured. Also creating additional user 
credentials for daily tasks without administration right 
could be relevant task. And if possible to keep number of 
users with administration rights as low as possible. 
 Technical impact Most successful attacks start with vulnerability probing. 
Allowing such probes to continue can raise the likelihood of 
successful exploit to nearly 100 %. 
 Business impact Compromising sensitive data in IoT platform lead losses of 
reputation. The loss of reputation always leads to financial 
losses. 
 
 
The attack vector above is a scenario where other IoT customer, tenant, can 
manipulate and compromising another customer’s data, configuration and sensitive 
customer data. The above could be possible in such circumstances where a malicious 
customer starts scanning a network by using the configuration information based on 
their own environment. Typically, in such environment from service provider the 
basic settings are normally standardized and therefore, basic user IDs and other 
settings are easily feasible. The mitigation in such case is basically in the customer’s 
own responsibility by changing the default credentials to fulfil standard for password 
policy. 
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Table 11. Denial of Service attack 
Denial of Service attack against IoT environment 
Attack vector Attack is focused on making the site, application or service 
unavailable for the purpose it was designed for legitimate 
users by generating network or computing load.  
Security weakness The possible areas for security weakness are TCP protocol 
retransmission timeout, servers overload with flooding 
memory or another component in environment.  
Prevention, and 
mitigation measures 
There are no exact tools to protect against DoS.  Monitoring 
and logging mechanism have significant role to preventing 
DoS attacks. 
Technical impact Most successful attacks start with vulnerability probing. 
Allowing such probes to continue can raise the likelihood of 
successful exploit to nearly 100 %. 
Business impact The customer services could unavailable for legitimate users. 
That will cause monetary and reputation loses, also potential 
problems to production if attack target used as production 
management  
 
 
The Denial-of-Service attack, DoS, could be a relevant attack against this case study 
environment. Possible targets for DoS attack could be application servers, sensors 
and the cooler unit. The Dos attack against application servers with considerable 
number of requests could cause the application to cease from normal operation, 
which could lead to a situation where temperature sensor data is queued or 
postponed, and the cooler unit is out of control. Also, one possible scenario could be 
that the cooler unit is not any more capable of performing its tasks, which would lead 
to overheating of the environment. 
Table 12 shows the key elements for the Man-In-the-Middle attack vector. Also, 
possible prevention and mitigation solutions are listed in table. 
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Table 12. Man-In-the-Middle 
Man-In-the-Middle attack against IoT environment, MitM (Infosec guide 2017.) 
Attack vector The malicious counterpart is listening legitimate 
communication between different part of the organization. 
Attack purpose is to manipulate or steal the data so that 
legitimate user does not know or realize that data is 
manipulated or compromised. One possible aspect is also 
that Man-In-Middle attack purpose is to only steal sensitive 
data. 
Security weakness The MitM attack could be done via following methods and 
vulnerabilities: 
- Address resolution Protocol ARP cache poisoning 
- SSL and TSL hijacking 
- Domain name server, DNS, Spoofing  
Prevention, and 
mitigation measures 
The mitigation method for above weaknesses are following:   
adding static ARP table prevents attacker from using the ARP 
requests, implementing the HTTP Strict Transport Security, 
HSTS, allows user only access through SSL or TSL. Mitigation 
against the DNS spoofing is difficult one because it is hard to 
detect. By clearing the DNS cache will help and there is 
available application for Microsoft based servers for 
tightening DNS security, Domain Name Security System 
Extension, DNSSEC. 
Technical impact The realization of man-in-middle attack needs technical skills 
to perform. There should be also access to network for 
implementing necessary vulnerability modules for 
performing the MitM attack. 
Business impact The data which is transfer from sensor devices to servers 
could be compromised and therefore the legitimate use of 
data is out of date. 
 
The Man-In-The-Middle attack is a likely threat in the IoT environment. Quite often 
there is a situation that after initial setup the IoT device, consumer devices, is left out 
of any monitoring or security enhancement, which provides a possible path for Man-
In-The-Middle attacks. When considering the case study environment, the MitM 
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attack is possible, yet, quite hard to implement. The target with MitM attack would 
be to manipulate the data between sensors and analysing servers. Additionally, 
stealing the data would be the target in general. 
 
7.5 Information gathering for case study environment 
 
The basic scanning against the network devices in IoT environment was performed 
by using the Kali Linux servers with default applications included in Kali distribution. 
The IoT environment was configured with default settings. 
The scanning of the environment started with network scanning for all possible 
devices in the network and it was run with Network Mapper, NMAP, application, 
with the following parameters as shown in Figure 15: 
 
 
Figure 15. NMAP scan against sensors 
 
The results indicate that there were three IoT devices within that network segment, 
with addresses 37.52.209.205, 37.52.209.207 and 37.52.209.213 even though the 
NMAP was able to find altogether five devices.  
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The application server’s names were known. Therefore, the first scan was performed 
with DNS names to get an overview of the IP addresses. Additionally, the purpose 
was to collect information about open ports and running services in the servers. 
Figure 16 shows the results of the scan. 
 
 
Figure 16. NMAP scan against application servers 
 
Based on the above NMAP scanning, the detected IP addresses and hosts names are 
listed in Table 13 for this IoT environment. 
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Table 13. Name and IP address correlation 
Device IP address 
iot.satsuma.com 94.101.0.102 
portal.satsuma.com 94.101.0.101 
cloud.satsuma.com 94.101.0.100 
container.satsuma.com 94.101.0.102 
Sensor AMQP 37.52.209.205 
Sensor MQTT 37.52.209.207 
Cooler MQTT 37.52.209.213 
 
 
The names for application servers were already known and therefore the scanning 
against them was performed with basic syntax to get more information from them. 
The second NMAP run against detected devices was performed with following syntax 
to get more information from the devices itself: 
nmap -v -sS -sV -sU -A -oN /root/k3020/<scan target> <ip> 
With those options, NMAP was able to scan more information from the devices, e.g. 
operating system version, open services and their versions. Figure 17 summarizes the 
NMAP findings; the complete outputs are to be found in the Appendices part.  
The used operating systems and applications and their versions were following: 
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Figure 17. NMAP detailed findings 
 
 
The other main used tool was Nessus scanner installed in Kali Linux distribution. The 
purpose of using Nessus was to identify possible vulnerabilities, configuration issues 
and malware, which might be possible threats for the environment.  
Nessus scanner allows the user to select a pre-defined network and device scanner 
options such as “Host Discovery”, “Basic Network Scan” and “Advanced Scan”. The 
selected scan type in this case was “Advanced Scan”. Advanced Scan allows the user 
to select different kinds of plugins to perform wide scans against the selected host 
names or IP addresses even though by default the major part of plugins is pre-
selected. 
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Nessus scan results below were run against the IP addresses in the environment as 
an Advanced scan. The detailed overview for each device is seen in Figure 18 with 
the outputs. 
 
 
Figure 18. Nessus Advanced scan against devices 
 
 
The Nessus Advanced scan gave interesting results from the environment.  
The first perception was that Nessus Advanced scan was able to detect several 
“Medium” level classified vulnerabilities from the application hosts. These 
vulnerabilities need a more specified investigation. Secondly, Nessus Advanced scan 
was able to identify many “Info” classified type of vulnerabilities from the application 
hosts.  
The sensors and cooler side findings with Nessus were only “Info” classified type of 
vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities with category “Info” typically do not need any further 
analyses. The vulnerabilities with category “Medium” should be analysed more 
specifically because they are potential risks for offensives by vulnerabilities. 
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The detailed Nessus findings are seen below for each device scanned in network. 
After each figure there is a summary with more explanations about the findings. The 
recommended actions and tasks are listed in next chapter.  
 
 
Figure 19. Cloud.satsuma.com Nessus Advanced scan result 
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Figure 19 presents the scan results for cloud.satsuma.com application server. As can 
be seen, there are eight vulnerabilities with category “Medium” which must be 
analysed more in detail. Five of those vulnerabilities are related to the SSL and one 
for HTTP and browsable web directories. The PLUGIN 85582 is vulnerable for 
Clickjacking. 
 
 
Figure 20. Portal.satsuma.com Nessus Advanced scan result 
62 
 
Figure 20 presents the scan results for portal.satsuma.com server. Nessus has 
detected the same possible vulnerability as with the cloud.satsuma.com, the Web 
Application Vulnerable to Clickjacking. One SSL based vulnerability was masked as 
medium, PLUGIN 90317. The rest of the findings for this server is more information 
type of data. 
 
 
Figure 21. Iot.satsuma.com Nessus Advanced scan result 
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Figure 21 presents the scan results for iot.satsuma.com server. Nessus was able to 
detect six medium classified vulnerabilities and the rest of the findings is information 
type of data. The key point here is that for this device, five of those findings are 
related to the SSL protocol. The Web Server finding was related to the possibly 
malicious JavaScript. 
 
 
Figure 22. Sensor AMQP Nessus Advanced scan result 
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Figure 22 presents the scan results for temperature AMQP sensor. This device is one 
of the sensors for collecting ambient temperature data from the environment. Based 
on Nessus scanning, all notified vulnerabilities are classified as information type of 
data. 
 
 
Figure 23. Sensor MQTT Nessus Advanced scan result 
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Figure 23 presents the scan results for temperature MMTT sensor. This device is also 
the sensor for collecting ambient temperature data. Based on Nessus scanner, 
twenty (20) findings are classified as information type of vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Figure 24. Cooler MQTT Nessus Advanced scan result 
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Figure 23 presents the scan results for the cooler unit in this environment. As can be 
seen above, Nessus scanner was not able to detect any critical, high, medium or low 
types of vulnerabilities. Instead, only twenty (20) of information type observations 
were detected. 
 
7.6 Recommendations based on scanning 
 
When starting to consider possible actions for preventing attackers to compromise 
this case study IoT environment, there are different tasks and recommendation 
actions to perform.  
 
7.6.1 NMAP recommendations 
 
The output from NMAP command gave the basic information from the devices like 
the open ports, services and possible operating system level. The output from NMAP 
gives the attacker path and method to start considering a possible route to exploit 
the environment. The NMAP is typically used in the early state of an attack as an 
espionage tool. The key is to collect as much as possible valuable information from 
the environment to help attackers to build up techniques to exploit the known 
vulnerabilities against the environment. 
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Figure 25. NMAP detailed findings 
 
 
Figure 25, NMAP detailed findings, shows clearly the versions used in this 
environment. The used operating system versions are based on Linux kernel 3.x and 
4.x. The latest available stable version currently is 4.16.5. One issue is with used 
version of OpenSSH 6.7p1. According to the source (CVE Details 2018), the OpenSSH 
version 6 up till 7 has severe vulnerabilities, which allows hackers to cause a Denial of 
Service, DoS, attack against OpenSSH. The latest available version is version 7.6. 
Based on NMAP scanning, also Apache httpd should be upgraded from 2.4.6 to 
2.4.33 due to the severe vulnerabilities. (Apache HTTP Server Project N.d.) 
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Severe vulnerabilities were also detected with Python because the installed version is 
2.7.5 and the latest version is 3.4.8, which has mitigations against vulnerabilities. 
(Python N.d.). 
The recommendation based on findings with NMAP is to close unused ports and 
services to prevent any unwanted penetration activity. Also, it is strongly 
recommended to upgrade used services to the latest versions, because at this point 
those were far behind the safest versions. Table 14 summarizes the need for 
upgrading different modules. 
 
 
Table 14. Versions to upgrade 
Module Installed version Latest available 
Linux kernel  3.x and 4.x 4.16.5 
OpenSSH 6.7p1 7.6 
Apache 2.4.6 2.4.33 
HAproxy 1.3.1 1.8.4 
 
 
7.6.2 Nessus recommendations 
 
Nessus scanner results are quite clear and straightforward to implement. Nessus 
reported several vulnerabilities related to the SSL protocol for all application servers. 
Therefore, the recommended actions for all those applications servers are almost 
equal.  The following tables (Tables 15, 16, 17) summarize the detected 
vulnerabilities for recommended mitigation actions based on Nessus scanned results. 
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Table 15. Vulnerabilities detected by Nessus 
Host cloud.satsuma.com, 92.101.0.100 
Plugin Name Mitigation 
51192 SSL 
Certificate 
Cannot Be 
Trusted 
The X.509 certificate for this service cannot be trusted. 
Purchase or generate a proper certificate for this service. 
57582 SSL Self-
Signed 
Certificate 
The SSL certificate chain for this service ends in an 
unrecognized self-signed certificate. Purchase or generate 
a proper certificate for this service. 
11213 HTTP TRACE 
/ TRACK 
Methods 
Allowed 
Debugging functions are enabled on the remote web 
server. Disable these methods. Refer to the plugin output 
for more information. 
20007 SSL Version 2 
and 3 
Protocol 
Detection 
The remote service encrypts traffic using a protocol with 
known weaknesses. Consult the application's 
documentation to disable SSL 2.0 and 3.0. 
Use TLS 1.1 (with approved cipher suites) or higher 
instead. 
40984 Browsable 
Web 
Directories 
Some directories on the remote web server are browsable. 
Make sure that browsable directories do not leak 
confidential informative or give access to sensitive 
resources. 
Additionally, use access restrictions or disable directory 
indexing for any that do. 
42873 SSL Medium 
Strength 
Cipher Suites 
Supported 
The remote service supports the use of medium strength 
SSL ciphers. Reconfigure the affected application if 
possible to avoid use of medium strength ciphers. See also 
https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2016/08/24/sweet32/ 
85582 Web 
Application 
Potentially 
The remote web server may fail to mitigate a class of web 
application vulnerabilities. 
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Vulnerable 
to 
Clickjacking 
Return the X-Frame-Options or Content-Security-Policy 
(with the 'frame-ancestors' directive) HTTP header with 
the page's response. 
This prevents the page's content from being rendered by 
another site when using the frame or iframe HTML 
tags. 
90317 SSH Weak 
Algorithms 
Supported 
The remote SSH server is configured to allow weak 
encryption algorithms or no algorithm at all. Contact the 
vendor or consult product documentation to remove the 
weak ciphers. See also 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-6.3 
 
 
As can be seen above, by purchasing or regenerating the proper SSL certificate, 
(51192, 57582) some of the vulnerabilities would be prevented. Also, reconfiguring 
(42873) the SSL and by removing the weak cipher (90317) would solve two 
vulnerabilities. Also, disabling SSL 2.0 and 3.0 (20007) would prevent several 
cryptographic flaws detected in those versions. Implementing the TLS1.1 or higher 
with proper cipher version or higher would protect against the cryptographic flaws. 
Vulnerability 40984 is related to the browsing directories in the web server. This 
vulnerability allows attacker to fetch sensitive information from web server. 
(Directory Indexing 2010; Common Weakness Enumeration 2018.) 
Vulnerabilities 11213 and 85582 are both related to the remote web servers. The 
11213 is a rather old vulnerability, which can be prevented by disabling the HTTP 
TRACE support from the web server. It should also be noted that this vulnerability is 
related to Apache, and therefore upgrading Apache to the latest version is essential. 
The 85582 vulnerability is also rather old. There are few solutions for protecting 
against that vulnerability. The first one is to include frame-breaking functionality 
which prevents other pages from framing the site to defend. Another possible 
solution is to use JavaScript frame-breaking code. (OWASP 2017.) 
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Table 16. Vulnerabilities detected by Nessus 
Host portal.satsuma.com, 92.101.0.101 
Plugin Name Mitigation 
85582 Web 
Application 
Potentially 
Vulnerable to 
Clickjacking 
The remote web server may fail to mitigate a class of 
web application vulnerabilities. 
Return the X-Frame-Options or Content-Security-Policy 
(with the 'frame-ancestors' directive) HTTP header with 
the page's response. 
This prevents the page's content from being rendered by 
another site when using the frame or iframe HTML 
tags. 
90317 SSH Weak 
Algorithms 
Supported 
The remote SSH server is configured to allow weak 
encryption algorithms or no algorithm at all. Contact the 
vendor or consult product documentation to remove the 
weak ciphers. See also 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-6.3 
 
 
The 85582 vulnerability is rather old. There are few solutions for protecting against 
that vulnerability. The first one is to include frame-breaking functionality, which 
prevents other pages from framing the site to defend. Another possible solution is to 
use JavaScript frame-breaking code. (OWASP 2017.) 
The vulnerability 90317 is fixed by removing the weak cipher.  
 
 
Table 17. Vulnerabilities detected by Nessus 
Host iot.satsuma.com, 92.101.0.102 
Plugin Name Mitigation 
51192 SSL 
Certificate 
The X.509 certificate for this service cannot be trusted. 
Purchase or generate a proper certificate for this service. 
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Cannot Be 
Trusted 
57582 SSL Self-
Signed 
Certificate 
The SSL certificate chain for this service ends in an 
unrecognized self-signed certificate. Purchase or generate 
a proper certificate for this service. 
42873 SSL Medium 
Strength 
Cipher Suites 
Supported 
The remote service supports the use of medium strength 
SSL ciphers. Reconfigure the affected application if 
possible to avoid use of medium strength ciphers. See also 
https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2016/08/24/sweet32/ 
45411 SSL 
Certificate 
With Wrong 
Hostname 
The SSL certificate for this service is for a different host. 
Purchase or generate a proper certificate for this service. 
10815 Web Server 
Generic XSS 
The remote web server is affected by a cross-site scripting 
vulnerability. Contact the vendor for a patch or upgrade. 
90317 SSH Weak 
Algorithms 
Supported 
The remote SSH server is configured to allow weak 
encryption algorithms or no algorithm at all. Contact the 
vendor or consult product documentation to remove the 
weak ciphers. See also 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-6.3 
 
 
The mitigation activities for this application server, iot.satsuma.com, are mainly the 
same as for other servers because Nessus detected the same vulnerabilities from all 
these servers. However, the vulnerabilities 45411 and 10815 need further 
investigation.  
The solution for 45411 is to generate or purchase a proper certificate because 
currently the common name field identified a different host name than what the 
actual server was.  
The 10815 is cross-site scripting related to the web server. This can occur when the 
attacker feeds malicious code by using the web application in form of browser side 
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script to a different end user. These kinds of flaws are quite common and by 
following several simple rules by OWASP’s (2018) XSS Prevention Cheat Sheep pages, 
the most of those serious attacks can be avoided. This vulnerability is also listed as a 
possible attack vector, OWASP ref A7:2017. Therefore, preventing this defect is 
important. 
Next, the sensors and cooler detections are to be discussed in detail. Nessus scanner 
notified an information classified type of vulnerabilities from both the temperature 
sensors and the cooler unit. Those vulnerabilities do not require any actions at this 
point because those can be counted as not critical ones. Nevertheless, it is good to 
be aware that these sensors and cooler unit are visible and open in the network for 
NMAP and Nessus scanning.  
As a summary for recommended actions, the key tasks are to correct the SSL’s 
certificate issues and configurations related to SSL. By fixing these issues, the overall 
security level could be much higher. Then, the next corrective action should be 
upgrading all software modules detected by NMAP. Also, it needs to be mentioned 
that the operating system version and patches should be upgraded in a regular 
manner. This is one of the key tasks to protect the environment against 
vulnerabilities.  
 
7.6.3 Management level recommendations 
 
When considering the needed actions to perform for enhancing the security level in 
the case study environment, the administrators should also take the needed 
workload against the risk level into account. If the risk level against a certain 
vulnerability is low, then the performed actions should be in proportion to that risk 
level. However, this is not only an administrator’s responsibility because the 
management should be also involved in decision making. The management is 
responsible for the development of a valid security policy, and that it is followed. The 
scope of security policy should be compared to the organization’s size and used 
resources. It is important to understand what is relevant to spend time on and what 
the relationship of the security policy is to business processes and core business.  
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There are several different methodologies to measure and estimate the risks caused 
by different vulnerabilities and threats. The demonstrative way to present a possible 
Risk Rating is to use OWASP’s (2017) generated method used in this case study. It 
contains an easy and visual way to categorize different attack vectors against real risk 
factor to create following, where different modules are listed with relevant 
numerical values. The key here is also to realize that creating the numerical risk table 
is an estimate, and it might differ from real life situation. However, it will give view 
and guidance what to focus on with the actions against threats. The detailed Risk 
Rating Methodology definitions with numerical values are listed in Appendix 3.  
First, there is a need to decide of the numerical scale for impact. Normally the scale 
is from 0-9 with following allocations for low, medium and high: 
 
 
Table 18. Impact numerical allocations 
Likelihood and impact 
0 – 3 Low 
3 – 6 Medium 
6 – 9  High 
 
 
The potential risks have been defined using possible attack vectors and findings with 
NMAP and Nessus scanners. The next step is to define the likelihood, estimated 
impact with different key elements, and after that the calculations of severity of risk 
can be done. 
The following calculation is based on the defined attack vector against this 
environment. The used attack vector in Table 19 is Broken Authentication, OWASP 
ref A2: 2017. 
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Table 19. Overall likelihood 
Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill level Motive Opportunity Size  Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detection 
3 3 3 3  3 3 3 3 
Overall likelihood = 3 (Medium) 
 
 
Table 20. Overall technical and business impact 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiality 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availability 
Loss of 
accountability 
 Financial 
damage 
Reputation 
damage 
Non-
compliance 
Privacy 
violation 
3 3 3 3  3 3 3 3 
Overall technical impact = 3 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 3 (Medium) 
 
 
After the determination and calculation of overall impact estimation values, these 
values can be compared to the overall risk severity in Table 21 to gain the best view 
of the final severity rating. 
 
Table 21. Overall risk severity 
Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
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Based on the above calculations ((3+3+3)/3), the overall risk severity factor is 3 and it 
can be categorized as Medium. However, the calculations should always be done 
based on the worst scenario and compared to the core business. Meaning that if the 
technical impact is high but the impact to the business is low, then the protection 
mechanisms should be based on that business level. The summary of the calculated 
risk severity is in Table 22. The rest of the corresponding calculations for attack 
vectors are found in the Appendices part, Appendix 3.  
The above calculation should serve as a guidance and aid to fulfil an organization’s 
security policy defining which vulnerabilities and threats will be fixed and with what 
schedule: immediately, soon, or during the next service break. 
Below is a complete table, Table 22 regarding the calculated Risk Ratings for different 
attack vectors. The rest of the calculations can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
 
Table 22. Risk ratings 
Possible risk Risk Severity 
Broken Authentication, OWASP ref A2: 2017 Medium 
Sensitive data exposure, OWASP ref A3: 2017 Medium 
Security misconfiguration, OWASP ref A6: 2017 Medium 
Cross-Site Scripting, OWASP ref A7: 2017 Medium 
Using component with known vulnerabilities, OWASP ref A9: 2017 Medium 
Insufficient logging & monitoring, OWASP ref A10: 2017 Medium 
Manipulating user data in different tenant inside IoT framework Medium 
Denial of Service attack against IoT environment Medium 
Man-In-the-Middle attack against IoT environment Medium 
NMAP scanner findings Medium 
NESSUS scanner findings Medium 
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As can be seen, the calculated risk severity factor for those attack vectors was 
classified as Medium. Those are estimates which might differ based on a different 
kind of emphasis depending on the organization’s requirements for cyber security. 
Medium classified risks need mitigation activities in near future to protect the 
environment. If any of those risk severities are calculated and defined higher than 
Medium, e.g. High or Critical, then that attack vector needs immediate mitigation 
action against that attack vector. Also, if any of the risk severities are lower than 
Medium, e.g. Low or Info, then the necessary mitigation actions should be performed 
in the future. This is the decision for the organization to do. 
 
 
8 Conclusion and discussion 
 
The Internet of Things, IoT, devices and appliances are getting more and more 
popular nowadays. Gartner (2017) estimates that the number of connected IoT 
devices could be 20 billion or more in year 2020. This will induce that the traditional 
ICT business decision makers are faced with a new kind of thinking. Quite often the 
IoT devices of the new era are installed to the premises supporting only one purpose. 
In the worst-case scenario, all normal maintenance procedures together with regular 
updates are ignored, which will lead to a situation where a significant group of IoT 
devices is available for possible hostile activities in the local premises or are to be a 
part of bigger attacks such as botnet. 
Currently, almost daily there are news and information about severe attacks 
generated by hackers using the IoT device in various locations. Those compromised 
IoT devices typically present consumer appliances. The industrial based IoT devices 
are seldom an attack target for hostile activities. This will cause the need for 
preparing protection for domestic market devices against external and internal 
vulnerabilities and attacks.  
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Based on the theoretical part of thesis, an IoT device could be visualized as a 
computer from the architectural point of view. However, there are few differences in 
IoT devices compared to computers; one difference in general being the sensor part 
for measuring data and the second difference being the size. Typically, IoT devices 
are small form factor devices, which will have a positive effect on the device power 
consumption.  
First, the theoretical part of this thesis is discussed. As mentioned above, the IoT 
environments are comparable to general ICT environments, i.e. even the smallest IoT 
environment needs life-cycle management approach from the development phase 
up to the production ready devices. Also, the complete data path from the raw data 
of the sensors to the visualization server and application should be defined clearly, 
and all components must be well-known. The responsibility about the life-cycle 
management for the IoT product is not only developers’ task and responsibility but 
very likely also management’s responsibility. The management should be thriving for 
the organization level security management policy, which should include elements 
such as securing the life-cycle of IoT environment, Information Security Management 
System (ISMS), disaster recovery processes and possible risk management 
calculations for assets based on possible attack vectors. Together with these 
elements, the information security must take confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(CIA) into consideration. These terms give the basic guidelines for handling, storing 
and delivering of the confidential data to other counterparts. Together with ISMS, 
the management should define and implement the security controls for different 
kinds of scenarios.  
The Security Information and Event Management, SIEM, is also one toolset which the 
management should consider implementing. There are vendors who provide SIEM as 
a service and some vendors offer SIEM as software. The SIEM provides tools for 
information gathering from the complete environment, identity management, 
vulnerability management and logging capabilities from various parts of 
environment.  
The security controls listed above must be implemented to all parts of an 
organization, and every single individual employee must know why such security 
controls have been defined and implemented in practice. They should also be aware 
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of actions and tasks which should be considered in case of emergency, such as 
communication path. The responsibilities related to the communication path must 
be defined and clearly communicated to all parties involved in it. If there is need to 
report deviation to authorities, the communication interface should be clearly 
defined, and a responsible person or organization defined.  
If organizations use partners, the defined security controls should be included in 
their processes also. When an organization starts considering and designing different 
security controls, the processes and tasks should be in line with the value of the IoT 
assets and valuation of the data.  
There are various toolsets to help and fulfil an organization’s needs what comes to 
designing and implementing security controls. The most appropriate tools should be 
selected based on a consideration of the IoT environment because not all toolsets 
are suitable for all organizations. Some of the toolsets are technical security control 
implementations, and some of them are more related to the organization’s way of 
operations.  
When considering the IoT environment, the technical security control 
implementations are quite like the ones in a traditional ICT environment. The 
physical protection of the IoT devices should be taken into consideration. There is a 
risk that physical devices are compromised if the access to the device’s ports, such as 
USB, serial or JTAG connectors, is not protected or is disabled by default. The risk of 
physical damage also should be taken into notice. The mitigation solution against a 
physical threat is to place the IoT device in secured location with access control 
implemented.  
Related to IoT device’s hardware solutions, the regular updates for firmware levels 
and possible core applications should be implemented. The updates should be 
configured in such a way that update packages are protected with checksums and 
possible certificates, and the source for the update is validated before downloading 
the packages. Also, one key point is to implement automated updates to ensure that 
software modules are always up-to-date with the latest level. 
One important part to implement and consider is the user management. Only the 
user who must have access to a system should have it, and all other users must be 
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restricted. The password policy should be defined in such a way that at least the 
length, lifetime and logout value are defined for all users. Also, when adding a new 
user to the system, the user must change the password within the first login attempt. 
Implementing strong password policy will protect the IoT environment against 
possible password cracking tools. 
The key point with an IoT device is to protect the network traffic. Typically, those 
devices use more often wireless network than wired network modules. This creates 
the demand to protect the transmission traffic between a sensor device and 
collecting point of data. Whenever it is possible, the secured transmission should be 
implemented to protect the data transmit. 
To have a clear view of the network traffic, a firewall with defined security rules 
should be implemented. The firewall gives opportunity to allow or restrict the traffic 
between different network modules. For having more information from the network 
traffic, the implementation of Intrusion Detecting Systems, IDS, and Intrusion 
Prevention System, IPS, should also be considered. Those tools together with the 
firewall implementation give the administrators more visibility of the network traffic 
and usage and time to reach for possible DoS attacks. 
Another key element also to mention is the logging system for the IoT environment. 
There could be different kinds of logs collected from systems such as system logs, 
usage logs, change logs and error logs. The proper implemented logging systems give 
a clear view of actions performed by different users. Also, any abnormal activities 
related to the environment could be notified from logs and then they can have a 
clear indication of hostile activities against environment. The important matter 
related to logs is log management. The logs should be stored and analysed is such a 
way that there is no risk of compromising the log data.  
One basic part of the implementation of technical security controls is to disable and 
close all unnecessary and unused ports and services. The rule could be that only a 
minimum number of ports and services should be open and active, and these are the 
ones related to the running applications. All other ports and services must be closed. 
When considering the case study environment used in this thesis, the findings with 
NMAP and Nessus scanners were convergent with the theoretical part of thesis. The 
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scanners were able to notify several out-of-date software modules which should be 
updated soon to mitigate possible threats generated by old software versions. The 
scanners also detected several issues related to old or weak SSL certificates. The 
issue with SSL is quite easily corrected by implementing a proper SSL certificate and 
configuring SSL in a proper way. Nessus was able to detect in the environment some 
more severe vulnerabilities, which should be corrected in the near future such as 
Web Application Clickjacking vulnerability and Web Server Generic XSS, cross-site 
scripting vulnerability. 
The research question defined for this thesis was of the writer’s own interest. The 
findings answering these questions are listed below as divided in the theoretical part 
and the case study. The thesis consists of a theoretical part on research architectural 
concept of IoT devices, and the practical part focused on finding answers for 
following research questions:  
- What is the level of cyber security initially within the IoT environment? 
- What is the minimum acceptable level of cyber security in IoT environment? 
- What are the minimum implementations for improving the cyber security in 
the IoT environment? 
When considering the first question, the answer is that the cyber security level of the 
IoT environment is not sufficient enough to protect environment from the cyber 
security perspective. The case study findings supported that view. From that 
perspective, the initially configured IoT environments need a security 
implementation.  
The second question and answer are mainly meant for management level 
stakeholders. They should define the organization’s cyber security policies and 
practices and make sure that the security controls are implemented in practice. They 
should take the monetary value and market values into notice when defining the 
security controls. Because investing a great deal of resources for a low level IoT 
implementation might not be relevant. However, on the other hand, the loss of 
market share and reputation are critical elements for a profit-making organization. 
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The third question and the answer for that are related to the second question. It is a 
management decision how much they will invest in protecting IoT environments or 
devices against possible cyber security threats. That decision defines the levels of 
security controls. For example, if the IoT appliance is the organization’s main product 
and vital from the profit aspect, then the security controls must be implemented in 
such a way that there is no risk of the IoT appliance being jeopardized by external 
intruders in any circumstances. 
As a summary, the outcome from thesis was that any of the IoT environments or 
appliances should be served as any other ICT or computer devices. The IoT 
appliances have the same modules as traditional computers and are in the same way 
also vulnerable for different kinds of external threats. Therefore, the protection of 
IoT appliances is as critical as any other computer system connected to the internet. 
Because by protection, the device itself is not the only thing but is protecting the 
other user on the internet as well. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1.  
Raspberry pi3 with SenseHat, temperature, air pressure and humidity 
measurement, Python code for collecting data 
##Libraries## 
 
from sense_hat import SenseHat 
from time import sleep 
from time import time 
from datetime import datetime 
 
##Main program## 
 
sense = SenseHat() 
 
counter = 0 
 
while counter < 50: 
 t = sense.get_temperature() 
 p = sense.get_pressure() 
 h = sense.get_humidity() 
 
 t = round(t, 1)  
 p = round(p, 1) 
 h = round(h, 1) 
 
 print(t) 
 print(p) 
 print(h) 
 sleep(4) 
 counter = counter + 1 
#copyright VSulkamo/8.10.2017 
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Appendix 2.  
Sensor output data from Raspberry and Sense HAT 
29.7 
1001.7 
35.3 
28.3 
1001.7 
36.1 
27.2 
1001.6 
39.0 
27.4 
1001.6 
40.2 
30.8 
1001.5 
39.9 
33.1 
1001.5 
37.7 
35.0 
1001.4 
35.3 
37.5 
1001.5 
33.7 
40.2 
1001.4 
31.1 
41.8 
1001.1 
29.0 
41.8 
1001.3 
27.9 
41.2 
1001.2 
27.3 
38.7 
1001.2 
27.8 
36.0 
1001.6 
28.8 
33.8 
1001.6 
30.5 
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Appendix 3.  
The OWASP Risk Rating Methology, 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology 
Below is summary of OWASP’s factor estimates for calculate the risk factor. The 
factor should be always to be proportion to own organization’s needs and 
requirements. 
Threat Agent Factors 
Skill level: How technically skilled is this group of threat agents? Security penetration 
skills (9), network and programming skills (6), advanced computer user (5), some 
technical skills (3), no technical skills (1) 
Motive: How motivated is this group of threat agents to find and exploit this 
vulnerability? Low or no reward (1), possible reward (4), high reward (9) 
Opportunity: What resources and opportunities are required for this group of threat 
agents to find and exploit this vulnerability? Full access or expensive resources 
required (0), special access or resources required (4), some access or resources 
required (7), no access or resources required (9) 
Size: How large is this group of threat agents? Developers (2), system administrators 
(2), intranet users (4), partners (5), authenticated users (6), anonymous Internet 
users (9) 
Vulnerability Factors 
Ease of discovery: How easy is it for this group of threat agents to discover this 
vulnerability? Practically impossible (1), difficult (3), easy (7), automated tools 
available (9) 
Ease of exploit: How easy is it for this group of threat agents to actually exploit this 
vulnerability? Theoretical (1), difficult (3), easy (5), automated tools available (9) 
Awareness: How well known is this vulnerability to this group of threat agents? 
Unknown (1), hidden (4), obvious (6), public knowledge (9) 
Intrusion detection: How likely is an exploit to be detected? Active detection in 
application (1), logged and reviewed (3), logged without review (8), not logged (9) 
91 
 
Technical Impact Factors 
Loss of confidentiality: How much data could be disclosed and how sensitive is it? 
Minimal non-sensitive data disclosed (2), minimal critical data disclosed (6), extensive 
non-sensitive data disclosed (6), extensive critical data disclosed (7), all data 
disclosed (9) 
Loss of integrity: How much data could be corrupted and how damaged is it? 
Minimal slightly corrupt data (1), minimal seriously corrupt data (3), extensive 
slightly corrupt data (5), extensive seriously corrupt data (7), all data totally corrupt 
(9) 
Loss of availability: How much service could be lost and how vital is it? Minimal 
secondary services interrupted (1), minimal primary services interrupted (5), 
extensive secondary services interrupted (5), extensive primary services interrupted 
(7), all services completely lost (9) 
Loss of accountability: Are the threat agents' actions traceable to an individual? Fully 
traceable (1), possibly traceable (7), completely anonymous (9) 
Business Impact Factors 
Financial damage: How much financial damage will result from an exploit? Less than 
the cost to fix the vulnerability (1), minor effect on annual profit (3), significant effect 
on annual profit (7), bankruptcy (9) 
Reputation damage: Would an exploit result in reputation damage that would harm 
the business? Minimal damage (1), Loss of major accounts (4), loss of goodwill (5), 
brand damage (9) 
Non-compliance: How much exposure does non-compliance introduce? Minor 
violation (2), clear violation (5), high profile violation (7) 
Privacy violation: How much personally identifiable information could be disclosed? 
One individual (3), hundreds of people (5), thousands of people (7), millions of 
people (9) 
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Appendix 4.  
Overall risk severity calculations 
Sensitive data exposure, OWASP ref A3: 2017 (OWASP 2017) 
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
4 4 2 2  3 3 3 3 
Overall likelihood = 3 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
violati
on 
4 4 3 4  3 4 4 4 
Overall technical impact = 3,75 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 3,75 (Medium) 
Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 1, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
 
Security misconfiguration, OWASP ref A6: 2017 (OWASP 2017) 
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
4 4 4 2  8 3 4 3 
Overall likelihood = 4 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
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violati
on 
3 3 3 3  3 3 3 3 
Overall technical impact = 3 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 3 (Medium) 
Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 2, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
 
Cross-Site Scripting, OWASP ref A7: 2017 (OWASP 2017) 
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
5 4 4 2  3 2 5 4 
Overall likelihood = 3,625 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
violati
on 
3 3 3 3  3 3 3 3 
Overall technical impact = 3 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 3 (Medium) 
Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 3, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
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Using component with known vulnerabilities, OWASP ref A9: 2017 (OWASP 2017) 
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
6 3 3 2  3 3 4 4 
Overall likelihood = 3,5 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
violati
on 
3 3 3 3  3 3 3 3 
Overall technical impact = 3 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 3 (Medium) 
Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 4, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
 
Insufficient logging & monitoring, OWASP ref A10: 2017 (OWASP 2017) 
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
4 4 4 2  4 3 3 3 
Overall likelihood = 3,375 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
violati
on 
3 3 3 3  3 3 3 3 
Overall technical impact = 3 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 3 (Medium) 
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Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 5, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
 
Manipulating user data in different tenant inside IoT framework 
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
5 4 4 2  3 3 2 3 
Overall likelihood = 3,25 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
violati
on 
5 4 4 3  5 5 5 4 
Overall technical impact = 4(Medium)  Overall business impact = 4,75 (Medium) 
Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 6, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
 
Denial of Service attack against IoT environment 
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
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Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
5 4 5 2  4 5 4 3 
Overall likelihood = 4 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
violati
on 
3 3 5 3  3 3 3 3 
Overall technical impact = 3,5 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 3 (Medium) 
Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 7, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
 
Man-In-the-Middle attack against IoT environment 
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
6 5 4 2  3 4 5 4 
Overall likelihood = 4,125 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
violati
on 
6 5 5 4  4 4 4 4 
Overall technical impact = 5 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 4 (Medium) 
Overall risk severity 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
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Impact 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 8, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
 
NMAP findings 
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
4 2 3 2  4 4 3 3 
Overall likelihood = 3,125 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
violati
on 
3 3 3 3  3 3 3 3 
Overall technical impact = 3 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 3 (Medium) 
Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 9, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
 
NESSUS findings  
 Threat agent factor  Vulnerability factors 
Skill 
level 
Motive Opportunity Siz
e 
 Ease of 
discovery 
Ease of 
exploit 
Awareness Intrusion 
detectio
n 
6 5 3 2  6 5 5 4 
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Overall likelihood = 4,5 (Medium) 
Technical impact, CIA  Business impact  
Loss of 
confidentiali
ty 
Loss of 
integrity 
Loss of 
availabil
ity 
Loss of 
accountabilit
y 
 Financi
al 
damage 
Reputati
on 
damage 
Non-
complianc
e 
Privac
y 
violati
on 
4 4 4 5  4 4 3 4 
Overall technical impact = 4,25 (Medium)  Overall business impact = 3,75 (Medium) 
Overall risk severity 
 
Impact 
HIGH Medium High Critical 
MEDIUM Low Medium* High 
LOW Note Low Medium 
 LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
 Likelihood 
Table 10, overall likelihood, technical and business impact 
